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OIL AND GAS-LEASES-VALIDITY WHEN EXECUTED BY LIFE TENANT AND 
R.EMAINDERMEN AT DIFFERENT TIMES-In 1952 plaintiffs acquired an oil 
and gas lease from the life tenant which they assigned two years later, 
reserving an overriding 1/16 royalty interest. Subject to plaintiffs' royalty 
rights this lease was eventually acquired by the defendant. In 1954, the 
remaindermen executed an oil and gas lease to defendant's wife who 
assigned a 7 /8 working interest to eight persons, and reserved a 1/8 working 
interest which she later assigned to defendant, subject to a 1/16 overriding 
royalty interest in herself. Action was brought by plaintiffs against defend-
ant, his wife and her eight assignees for a declaration of rights of the 
parties in oil being produced on land covered by the leases. The trial 
court concluded ·that title to the leases had merged and vested a valid 
oil and gas lease in the defendants who were working the property. 
On appeal, held, reversed. The life tenant's lease to plaintiffs was in-
valid when executed and was not validated by subsequent events. There 
was no merger of titles which could validate the lease because the entire 
interests were never joined in one person or a separate entity. Rowe v. 
Bird, (Ky. 1957) 304 S.W. (2d) 775. 
This decision applies the apparently uniform rule that neither a life 
tenant nor remainderman, acting alone, can convey a present right to 
take oil and gas.1 This rule has developed through application of the 
common law doctrine of waste. Minerals while in the ground constitute 
part of the realty and cannot be extracted by a life tenant. Since the life 
tenant cannot himself develop the land for oil and gas, he cannot create 
a greater right in others by lease~ Similarly the remainderman has no 
right to immediate possession of the land and thus no power to violate 
the life tenant's right to possession by leasing present interests to others. 
The court in the principal case acknowledges the invalidity of leases 
separately executed by the life tenants and remaindermen but appears 
to recognize that they can be validated by subsequent events. If it is ad-
mitted, however, that an ultimate merger of title will cure pre-existing 
defects, the question arises why the court concludes that a partial merger 
would not have the same effect. The trend of authority indicates a general 
policy to free petroleum-bearing land for development absent persuasive 
reasons to the contrary.2 It is arguable that since one defendant received 
all of the life tenant's interest subject to a 1/8 royalty and 1/8 of the 
defendant's wife's remainder interest, there could be a partial merger.3 
1 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS §§223, 224 (1938). 
2 Warren, "Policy Limitations on Oil and Gas Leasing," 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 474 at 474, 
506 (1956). 
3 See Bosley v. Burk, 154 Md. 27, 139 A. 543 (1927), where a purchaser of the life 
estate in the whole property, and later an undivided ¼ interest in remainder, through 
merger, became owner of an undivided ¼ in fee simple. See also Mdntosh v. Ropp, 233 
Pa. 497, 82 A. 949 (1912), where a lease by a life tenant was later ratified by one of two 
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Under this view, it might be argued that the defendant, having a valid lease 
on an undivided 1/8 interest in the fee, would have a right to extract 
minerals from the property despite the outstanding remainder interests.4 
It is therefore necessary to determine if the court, by denying relief, acted 
in conformity with the trend toward free development. The problem is to 
maximize protection of individual property interests of the life tenant 
and remainderman while promoting petroleum utilization. When a life 
tenant and remainderman execute a lease jointly,5 ratify the other's in-
dependent lease, 6 or accept the benefits created by the other's independ-
ently executed lease,7 each has consented to an invasion of his property 
rights.8 This same reasoning would seem to apply where the rights of 
both parties subsequently come to rest in one person or entity.9 But in 
the present case, allowing partial merger would enable the defendant to 
exploit the property, having only to account to the outstanding 7 /8 re-
mainder interests. At the same time, the lessees of the outstanding 7 /8 re-
mainder interest could not work the land, for to do so would violate the 
defendant's interest in the life estate. It would seem, therefore, that the 
basic objection to allowing a life tenant to give an oil and gas lease still 
obtains, and the outstanding remainder interests would not be adequately 
protected by .µlowing the defendant to proceed as he wished in this case. 
remaindermen. The court concluded the non-ratifying remainderman's rights are to 
be worked out on the basis of a lease by a co-tenant without the consent of the other 
co-tenant. 
4 A possible analogy may be found in the view of a majority of the courts that a 
co-tenant has a right to develop the land despite objection of the other co-tenants, 
having to account to his co-tenants for their share of the total production minus the costs 
of production. Williams, "The Effect of Concurrent Interests on Oil and Gas Transac-
tions," 34 TIDC. L. REv. 519 at 520 (1956); KULP, On. AND GAS RIGHTS §10.19 (1954). 
Moreover, Kentucky seems to adopt a more liberal rule ·than the majority. The non-
developing co-tenant may recover only a reasonable royalty from the developing co-tenant 
or his lessee on any oil or gas produced before the filing of his suit. The non-developing 
co-tenant's recovery is the same as under the majority rule for any oil produced after 
filing of the suit against the developing co-tenant or his lessee. Gillispie v. Blanton, 214 
Ky. 49, 282 S.W. 1061 (1926); New Domain Oil &: Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, 221 
s:w. 245 (1920). 
5 Meredith v. Meredith, 193 Ky. 192, 235 S.W. 757 (1921), cited in the principal case 
at 778; 2 THORNTON, On. AND GAS §430 (1932; Supp. 1956); 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS 
§224 (1938). 
6 Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co., 141 ,Kan. 147, 40 P. (2d) 463 (1935). Cf. Yost v. Ratliff, 
(Ky. 1951) 246 S.W. (2d) 447. 
7 2 SUMMERS, On. AND GAS §223 (1938). 
SConsent is a bar to an action of trespass brought by a life tenant. PROSSER, TORTS 
§18 (1955). Compare with Williams, "The Effect of Various Conditions of Ownership 
on Oil and Gas Transactions," 5 UTAH L. REv. I at 3 (1956), that the lease merely effects 
a transfer to the lessee of the veto power of the grantor on development by the other. 
9 It seems that whether this is viewed as consent .by the lessor, or as an estoppel of 
the lessor, it would not alter the result. See dictum at p. 778 of principal case. In both 
instances the party should be entitled to develop for oil and gas when he obtains both 
the life tenant's and remainderman's respective interests. 
656 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Moreover, allowance of a partial merger would increase the already dif-
ficult problems of an accounting.10 The court, in addition to determin-
ing the rights of holders of present, future, and royalty interests, would 
have to value the interests of those lessees in whom there was no partial 
merger, as opposed to the interests of the lessee in whom there was a valid 
partial merger. In the light of these difficulties, insistence by this court on 
merger in one person or single entity, though perhaps an impediment to 
development of resources, seems justifiable as a means of protecting the 
property rights of both life tenant and remaindermen. If it is felt the 
policy of petroleum development is more important than protection of 
particular property interests, the solution would seem ultimately to rest 
with the legislature and not the courts.11 
Albert A. Haller 
10 When a life tenant and the owner of the future interest join in a lease and fail 
to make an agreement on the method of dividing lease proceeds, the apportionment 
of these proceeds has been the subject of considerable litigation. See generally Williams, 
"The Effect of Various Conditions of Ownership on Oil and Gas Transactions," 5 UTAH 
L. REv. 1 at 4-5 (1956); KULP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS §10.18 (1954). 
11 Some legislative progress ,has already •been made in this direction in some states 
by allowing land subject to contingent future interests to be leased, through court pro-
ceedings, by life tenants. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§353.300 to 353.380; Okla. Stat. 
(1941) tit. 60, §§71 to 73. 
